CASH SOCIAL TRANSFERS, DIRECT TAXES AND INCOME
The perception that socialist countries tried to "hide" Income distribution data Is due to three factors. The first is refusals to publish the data or in'tentional attempts at obfuscation by the Communist authorities. This however was limited to a few countries. Most notorious were the Soviet Union and Romania. The second factor is errors of interpretation or ignorance of the existing sources displayed by Western researchers. Examples include Lydall's (1984, p. 195) complaint In an otherwise very thorough discussion of income inequality in Yugoslavia that "(w)hat is needed for a study of... income inequality is a distribution of households or persons ranked by per capita income". He was apparently unaware that these data are published and are readily available. Morrisson (1984) in his often quoted comparative study of income distribution in capitalist and so:ialist countries is even unaware of the existence of income surveys in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; instead he uses some dubious extrapolations. The third factor was that East European students of income distribution were few as their topic itself was regarded by the authorities as rather suspect. Despite that .iie area of income distribution did not go unresearched: Polish (Lulek and Paga, 1989 , Okrasa, 1988 , Gorecki, Topinska and Wisniewski, 1984 , Flakierski, 1986 ,
Hungarian (Adam and Nosal, 1982) , Yugoslav (Flakierski, 1989 , Milanovic, 1990 or comparative East European (Kende and Strmiska, 1988) income distributions were well studied and papers were available in English.
1980. In Czechoslovakia, large household surveys were conducted since 1958
at three-to five-year intervals although the results were not widely distributed. In Hungary, household budget surveys were conducted at oneor two-year intervals since 1978 and larger income surveys every five years since 1962. Even longer data series exist for the distributions of state-sector wages. In Poland and Hungary, the distributions were published practically annually since 1956, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria since 1962-3, and in Czechoslovakia they were available at more or less bi-annual intervals since 1959.
The pattern of income distriLution in socialism was recently summarized by Phelps-Brown (1988, pp. 303-4) .
"...the three Soviet-type distributions [Hungarian, Soviet and Czechuslovak] ... are much more egalitarian than the Western type. The difference arises mainly from a slower rise of income above the median, that is, broadly: the more skilled manual occupations and still more the higher clerical, the professional and administrative, are paid less than in the West relatively to the bulk of manual workers. Allowance for 'perks' reduices the contrast, but is unlikely to remove it."
While the overall shape of income distribution is reasonably well understood, very little is known about some specific income distribution issues, and, in particular, the incidence of taxes and cash social transfers. The incidence analysis is not solely of historic 1 relevance.
While a number of economic aspects have changed in the East, little has changed in social policy. This is understandable because such changes affect entitlements of various groups, and, particularly in conditions of decreasing income, such changes are difficult to implement. The only change of note since the end of Communism was the introduction of unemployment insurance. The current distribution of benefits and taxes will determine the direction of future changes; only if one knows with some precision who are the present net beneficiaries can an adequate new policy be designed.
In Section 1, I discuss distribution of cash social transfers.
Section 2 looks at the effect of direct and payroll taxes on income distribution and the combined impact of cash transfers and taxes. Section 3 contrasts the worlds of welfare socialism and capitalism. The last section presents the conclusions and examines the likely impact of transition to capitalism on the current system of social welfare. Table I (all concentration and Gini coefficients in the paper are represented as percentages, I e. multiplied by 100).
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In some countries (Poland and Bulgaria) sickness benef'.ts are paid by enterprises and thus are not shown as governmenit (social) transfers. (Figure 1 ).7 The concentration coefficients of cash transfers in market economies in our sample, see Table 2 , range from -16 to -44. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that transfers are skewed towards the poor; they are progressive. 8 
6
Gross income is equal to original income (wages plus net self-employment income plus property income plus other income beforo government redistribution) plus government cash transfers. Gross income is the central income concept that I use. Wages are net of payroll taxes (see Section 2). Disposable income is equal to gross incomev minus direct personal taxes. Since direct personal taxes in all countries except Hungary are negligible, there is no practical difference between gross and disposable income.
7
The increase in transfers between the first and the second decile in the UK and Sweden occurs because individuals in the second and third income decile recei-e most of the transfers in the form of relatively higher pensions while those in the lowest decile receive them as relatively lower non-contributory benefits (welfare).
8 Progressivity compares the distribution of an income source (transfer) or a tax with the distribution of gross income. For taxes, when their share in gross income increases with increase in income, we say that Cash transfers by Income deciles (country average 1) , Table 4 Appendix 1, p.142). Data for socialist economies are from the surveys. Data for Chile include state-mandated pensions; they are for the year 1987 and are calculated from Haindl, Budinich and Irrazaval (1989, Table 1.10-1.12, pp. 47-9) . Since the data for market economies are of the form D(HjyH) while the data for socialist economies and Chile are of the form D(plyp ) transfers would appear somewhat less progressive in market economies (see Rule number 3 in Milanovic, 1992) . The opposite effect is exerted by the fact that gross income in socialist economies is practically the same as disposable income (a-calculated progressivity decreases as we move from original to gross to uisposable income).
I
For comparability purposes, I have used in Table 2 only such data for market economies where recipients are ranked according to gross Income.
The more frequently available data, where recipients are ranked according to original income, show greater progressivity of transfers.5 This occurs because of the violation of horizontal equity as some households with low original income and high transfers overtake households with a higher original Income and lower transfers. Relatively better-off households, according to gross or disposable income, are then shown as recipients of transfers and the degree of the calculated progressivity decreases. In general, we expect progressivity to go down as we move from original to gross to disposable income.
Among East European countries, Yugoslavia is an exception because the distribution of social transfers approximates the distribution of Zr,ss income (see Table 1 ). This is due to the republicanization ef pension and social welfare funds whereby significant differences in average pension levels, reflecting differences in wages, between richer and poorer republics were maintained.
Family allowances play a very important role in the three Central European countries. They are, after pensions, the most important cash transfer, with a share in gross income of 5 to 6 percent. This contrasts with an average share of 1-1.5 percent of gross income in West European market economies. ° In Poland, family allowances are not paid to private farmers and the difference between private farmers and workers, in terms how much family allowances they receive, Is substantial (Table 3).   9 See, for example, Mitchell (1991, Annex C).
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Calculated from O'Higgins, Schmaus and Stephenson (1989, p. 116) . Figure 2 ). Family allowances are the only income source that is both Important and focused on the poor, albe't by default, because they are paid In respect of children, and there is generally a strong correlation between the number of children and the level of per capita income. Family allowances achieve a significant reduction in inequality, lowering the overall Gini coefficient by 0.4 points In Bulgaria, 0.6 points in Poland, 1.3 points in Hungary and 1.6 points in CSFR (Table 3) . Pro-poor family allowances, combined with pensions that account for two-thirds to three-fourth of total cash transfers and display low concentration coefficients, 8 to 9 In CSFR and Hungary, 11 In Bulgaria, and -2.6 in Poland, produce the already noted almost equal per capita distribution of all cash transfers. Income concentration is slightly reduced (see Table 5 ).
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In Czechoslovakia, wage tax rebates are given in respect to dependent child but at a rate increasing with the wage level. The overall impact of wage taxes on inequality was thus a product of two opposing effects: the number of children which is negatively correlated with household per capita income, and the wage level which is positively correlated. See Dlouhy (1991, p. 4) .
Strictly, if the concentration curve of an income source s lies outside the Lorenz curve, then proportional tax on s will shift the Lorenz curve inward. This will happen because the importance of the pro-rich source s in total income will decrease. (Table 5 ). As expected, payroll and wage taxes have practically no impact except in Hungary where direct taxes reduce income concentration by 1.7 Gini points. In Yugoslavia, social transfers and direct taxes have practically no effect on original income distribution.14 14
These are only approximate effects of redistribution because departures from horizontal equity are not accounted for. For example, for
Poland, CSFR and Yugoslavia, the Gini coefficient is calculated with respect to gross income (Gg). The concentration coefficient of disposable income (Cd) is less than or equal to the Gini coefficient of disposable income (Gd). Consequently, redistribution measured by Cd-Gg will be an overestimate of G d-Gg. The redistributive Impact of social transfers, however, is underestimated because it is measured by C0-Gg rather than, as
It ideally should be, by G0-Gg where o=original income. Table 2 . d/ For Poland, CSFR and Bulgaria, gross income (after payroll taxes), but before a practically negligible personal income tax. For Hungary, disposable income. Sources: In Hungary there are the employee-(10 percent of gross wage) and the enterprise-financed (43 percent of wage bill) social security contributions. The data on the employee-financed part are reported in household surveys; I impute the enterprise-financed part. In Czechoslovakia there are also two taxes on state-sector labor. Wage tax (12.4 percent of gross wage) is reported in household surveys; payroll tax paid by enterprises is 50 percent and is imputed. In Poland (43 percent of the wage bill), Yugoslavia (51.4 percent), and Bulgaria (42 percent), the whole tax is paid by enterprises and is imputed. Yugoslav taxes finance also health and education. Bulgarian tax is composed of 30 percent social security tax and an estimated 12 percent wage tax withheld at source. Table 4 .
In market economies, too, transfers are much more potent instrument of redistribution than taxes; but there are two Important differences: taxes do play some redistributive role, and social transfers are more efficient, In the sense that the same amount of cash transfers, measured as percentage of gross household Income, achieve a greater reduction in the concentration of income. As Table 5 is Net benefits are defined as the difference between cash social transfers (Table 1 ) and direct and quasi-direct taxes (Table 4) . Indirect taxes and subsidies, and benefits in-kind are not Included. To make the data for East European countries and the UK more comparable, employers' contributions to National Insurance In the UK are assumed to be paid by workers (as It is implicitly assumed for all of payroll taxation In Eastern Europe). The socialist welfar, system differs from the three capitalist worlds by virtue of an almost total absence of transfer targeting. This is due to the Intrinsic features of the system. With full employment and high participation rates, the role of social transfers cannot be to compensate for lack of labor income. The poor are generally those outside the state employment and pension system: they are accidents who live at the societal margin. The Communist state, whose philosophical foundation Is that everybody should work, preferably in the state sector, tends to regard the poor as unworthy of sympathy and aid. This was, in a certain way, the Calvinist work-ethic pushed to its extreme. Moreover, the system being a dictatorship, there was no need even for the enlightened self-interest that prompted the Victorian upper classes to accede to a residual welfare system in order to preempt a lower-class uprising. On the other hand, a compressed wage structure and relatively mild income differences do not call for a progressive tax system.
Tn terms of the size of transfers, the socialist welfare system stands between the conservative and the social-democratiu system. 16
16 Social transfers expressed in terms of total households' income are often greater in socialist than in market economies while the reverse is true when transfers are expressed in terms of GDP. Thus for the period of the 1980s, Rutkowska (1991) finds that cash social transfers in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia averaged about 10 percent of GDP vs. 12 percent for OECD as a whole and 15.8 for social welfare OECD countries. In terms of households income, the difference is less or is moreover in favor of socialist countries. This is due to the fact that It could be asked if the differences in the size of transfers and targeting are due to systemic differences between socialist and capitalist economies or, for example, to differences in incomr levels.17 The reason why the differences are, in my opinion, systemic is that the observed size and pattern of transfers in socialism can be directly related to some philosophical premises on which the system was based. The large size of transfers is derived from the emphasis on social consumption rather than on individual consumption. Lack of targeting derives both from the absence of large market income differences, which in r%her countries transfers are supposed to even out, lack of concern with the poor, as explained above, and egalitarianism Implicit in emphasis on social consumption. be changed. This is in contrast to the hypothesis put forth by Okrasa (1988, p. 637) , namely that "[r]edistribution of income through social transfers in Poland -and in the East-pays more attention to vertical equity across particular socio-economic groups than in the West, but at the same time it is less successful in meeting the objective of horizontal equity". The first part of his statement is correct but not the second.
households receive a smaller portion of GDP in socialism than in capitalism: for example, almost none of corporate saving and investment in socialism is mediated through personal (household) income. I am thankful to a referee for pointing out this problem. h,t * _1emI" t-.
*.d.IIt
In los-MO. Table 2 . A more fundamental problem Is the suitability of using money income alone to measure inequality in conditions where there is rationing, subsidization and widespread payments in kind. To quote Bergson (1984, p. 1058) "(w)ith prices below clearing levels, money income ceases to be the sole determinant of capacity to acquire goods; to a degree, fortitude in searching out supplies and standing in queues, and plain luck, become consequential". Households receive implicit income from consumer subsidies, which hold prices below equilibrium levels, below-market rents, negative interest rates charged on consumer loans, collective consumption such as enterprise financed health care, cafeterias, vacations, etc., or special, often in-kind, bonuses and premia. On the other hand, households' income was implicitly reduced through the payment of negative interest rates on saving deposits and the inflation tax on money.
Sources: as In

ANNEX -CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEYS AND ADEQUACY OF DATA
Data s*urces
Subsidies paid out by the state to cover the difference between costs of production and retail prices of consumer goods, inclusive of housing subsidies, give an indication of the size of of transfers. Because equilibrium prices of some of the subsidized products and services are greater than their costs of production, as is the case, for example, for housing or electricity where explicit subsidies cover only operacing costs, explicit subsidies represent a lower limit of actual transfers. Table Al shows that explicit subsidies ranged, in terms of GDP, between 6 and 7 percent and In terms of households' gross incomes amounted to twice that percentage. Only in Yugoslavia, were explicit subsidies negligible.
The pervasiveness of the system, subsidized vacations for workers, special shops stocked with unavailable consumer durables for miners, etc., does not allow one to assert, as is sometimes done, that inclusion of implicit Incomes would necessarily increase income disparity.18 On the 18 An exaggerated perception of the nomenklatura fringe benefits is common in Eastern Europe. It is due to often secretive nature in which these benefits were distributed. This has led people to ascribe them greater importance than they really had.
contrary, there is strong evidence that consumer subsidies, easily the largest chunk of implicit income, have an opposite effect which is likely to offset that of the nomenklatura perks. Using estimates by Matthews (1978) and various data on the nomenklatura perks in P?oland, Morrisson (1984) estimates an alternative income distribution in Eastern Europe that includes the monetized value of fringe benefits appropriated by the nomenklatura. Morrisson's results (1984, Table 2 ) suggest that the Gini ccefficient increases by 3 to 4 Gini points. On the other hand, consumer subsidies are income-equalizers and due to their size exert a significant impact on income distribution. For Poland, it is calculated that inclusion of consumer subsidies reduces income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, from 21.8 to 20.0. Kupa and Fajth (1990, p.37) similarly calculate for Hungary that the Gini coefficient is reduced from 23.1, for disposable income, to 22.0, for disposable income plus subsidies. Finally, for CSFR some preliminary evidence points to the same conclusion: the negative turnover tax, a type of consumer subsidy, represents 7.1 percent of households' expenditures in the lowest and 4.4 percent in the highest income decile (World Bank, 1991, p.59) . On the basis of household expenditure surveys, Vecernik (1991, p.17) calculates that lowest quart'le of households received per capita 7.5 percent more food subsidies than the average while the top quartile received 6.1 percent less than the average.19
The inclusion of consumer subsidies on top of the nomenklatura in-kind benefits would probably bring the Gini coefficient close to its money incomes only value. It can be thus argued that the use money Income yields an accurate picture of income inequality even in socialist economies. Moreover as far as international comparisons are concerned, similar adjustments for in-kind benefits could easily increase the measured inequality in market economies. In some countries, e.g. Japan, fringe benefits of upper management often exceed their salaries while the offsetting effects of consumer subsidies on income distribution are negligible. 2 0
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The implicit assumption is that households with different incomes pay the same average price for the subsidized good. In other words, if they do not buy the entire quantity at the subsidized price, the percentages of consumption at subsidized and free-market price are independent of the level of income.
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Note that social transfers to the poor are largely monetized and already Included in the money income.
